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Abstract. The strict security requirements placed on medical records
by various privacy regulations become major obstacles in the age of big
data. To ensure efficient machine learning as a service schemes while
protecting data confidentiality, in this work, we propose blind UNET
(BUNET), a secure protocol that implements privacy-preserving medi-
cal image segmentation based on the UNET architecture. In BUNET,
we efficiently utilize cryptographic primitives such as homomorphic en-
cryption and garbled circuits (GC) to design a complete secure protocol
for the UNET neural architecture. In addition, we perform extensive
architectural search in reducing the computational bottleneck of GC-
based secure activation protocols with high-dimensional input data. In
the experiment, we thoroughly examine the parameter space of our pro-
tocol, and show that we can achieve up to 14x inference time reduction
compared to the-state-of-the-art secure inference technique on a baseline
architecture with negligible accuracy degradation.
1 Introduction
The use of neural-network (NN) based machine learning (ML) algorithms in
aiding medical diagnosis, especially in the field of medical image computing, ap-
pears to be extremely successful in terms of its prediction accuracy. However,
the security regulations over medical records contradicts the use of big data in
the age of ML. Highly sensitive patient records are protected under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), where strong protection
measures need to be taken over all of the electronic Protected Health Informa-
tion (ePHI) possessed by a patient. In particular, access controls and client-side
encryption are mandated for the distribution of all ePHI records over public
networks [12,14]. In addition, while qualified professionals are allowed to handle
ePHI, the data exposure is required to be kept minimal [10,13], i.e., just enough
to accomplish the necessary professional judgements.
A central question to the real-world deployment of NN-based ML techniques
in medical image processing is how the related data transfer and computations
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can be handled securely and efficiently. Previous security measures on medical
data generally involved physical means (e.g., physically disconnected from the
internet), and these techniques clearly cannot benefit from the large-scale dis-
tributed computing networks available for solving ML tasks. Recent advances in
cryptography and multi-party secure computing seek alternatives to address the
security concerns. In particular, the concept of secure inference (SI) is proposed,
where Alice as a client wishes to inference on some of her inputs with the machine
learning models provided by the server, called Bob. The security requirement is
that no one, including Bob, learns anything about the inputs from Alice, while
Alice also learns nothing about the models from Bob. Over the past few years,
prior arts on SI flourished [6,15,17,18,22,24], where secure protocols targeted on
general learning problems were proposed. In addition, we also observe protocol-
and system-level optimizations [2,22] on SI. Unfortunately, most existing works
mentioned above do not have a clear application in mind. Thus, the utilized net-
work architectures and datasets (e.g., MNIST, CIFAR-10) are usually generic,
without immediate practical implications.
In this work, we propose BUNET, a secure protocol for the UNET archi-
tecture [23] that enables input-hiding segmentation on medical images. In the
proposed protocol, we use a combination of cryptographic building blocks to
ensure that client-side encryption is enforced on all data related to the patients,
and that practical inference time can also be achieved. As a result, medical in-
stitutions can take advantage of third-party machine learning service providers
without violating privacy regulations. The main contributions of this work are
summarized as follows.
– Privacy-Preserving Image Segmentation: To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to propose a secure protocol for image segmentation.
– Architectural Exploration for Secure UNET: We perform a search
on the possible alternative UNET architectures to reduce the amount of
computations (in terms of cryptographic realizations) in SI.
– Thorough Empirical Evaluations: By performing architectural-protocol
co-design, we achieved 8x–14x inference time reduction with negligible ac-
curacy degradation.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
In this work, we mainly consider the four types of cryptographic primitives:
a packed additive homomorphic encryption (PAHE) scheme based on the
ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem [4, 5, 8, 11], additive secret sharing
(ASS) [9], garbled circuits (GC) [26], and multiplication triples (MT) [1, 16]. In
what follows, we provide a brief overview for each primitive.
PAHE: A PAHE is a cryptosystem, where the encryption (Enc) and de-
cryption (Dec) functions act as group (additive) homomorphisms between the
plaintext and ciphertext spaces. Except for the normal Enc and Dec, a PAHE
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scheme is equipped with the following three abstract operators. We use [x] to
denote the encrypted ciphertext of x ∈ Zn, and n ∈ Z the maximum number of
plaintext integers that can be held in a single ciphertext.
– Homomorphic addition (⊞): for x,y ∈ Zn, Dec([x] ⊞ [y]) = x + y. Note we
can also perform homomorphic subtraction ⊟, where Dec([x]⊟ [y]) = x−y.
– Homomorphic Hadamard product (): for x,y ∈ Zn, Dec([x]  y) = x ◦ y,
where ◦ is the element-wise multiplication operator.
– Homomorphic rotation (rot): for x ∈ Zn, let x = (x0, x1, · · · , xn−1),
rot([x], k) = (xk, xk+1, · · · , xn−1, x0, · · · , xk−1) for k ∈ {0, · · · , n− 1}.
ASS and Homomorphic Secret Sharing: A two-party ASS scheme con-
sists of two operators, (Share,Rec), and some prime modulus pA ∈ Z. Each
operator takes two inputs, where we have sA = Share(x, sB) = (x− sB) mod pA
and x = Rec(sA, sB) = (sA + sB) mod pA. In [15], homomorphic secret sharing
(HSS) is adopted, where ASS operates over an encrypted x. For HSS, we have
that
[sA] = Share([x], sB) = ([x] ⊟ sB) mod pA, and (1)
[x] = Rec([sA], sB) = (sA ⊞ sB) mod pA. (2)
GC: GC can be considered as a more general form of HE. In particular,
the circuit garbler, Alice, “encrypts” some function f along with her input x
to Bob, the circuit evaluator. Bob evaluates f(x, y) using his encrypted input y
that is received from Alice obliviously, and obtains the encrypted outputs. Alice
and Bob jointly “decrypt” the output of the function f(x, y) and one of the two
parties learns the result.
MT: Beaver’s MT [1] is a technique that performs multiplication on a pair of
secret-shared vectors x = Rec(sA,x, sB,x) and y = Rec(sA,y+sB,y) between Alice
and Bob. Here, we take computations performed by Alice as an example, and
only note that the exact same procedure is also executed by Bob on his shares
of secrets. To compute x ◦ y, Alice and Bob first pre-share a set of respective
multiplication triples (aA,bA, cA) and (aB ,bB, cB), where we have Rec(aA, aB)◦
Rec(bA,bB) = Rec(cA, cB). Alice locally calculates dA = sA,x◦aA mod pA, eA =
bA ◦ sA,y mod pA. Then, Alice and Bob publish their results dA,dB and eA, eB.
Finally, Alice obtains
gA =
(
cA + (e ◦ sA,0,i) + (d ◦ sA,1,i)− d ◦ e
)
mod pA, (3)
where d = Rec(dA,dB) and similarly for e. MT guarantees that Rec(gA,gB) =
x ◦ y, where gB is the MT results computed by Bob.
2.2 Related Works on Secure Neural Network Inference
While a limited number of pioneering works have been proposed for secure infer-
ence and training with neural networks [15, 17, 18, 24], it was not until recently
that such protocols carried practical significance. For example, in [17], an infer-
ence with a single CIFAR-10 image takes more than 500 seconds to complete.
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Fig. 1. The overview of the BUNET protocol.
Using the same neural architecture, the performance was improved to less than 8
seconds in one of the most recent arts on SI, ENSEI [15]. Unfortunately, as shown
in Section 4, without UNET-specific optimizations and protocol designs, existing
approaches carry significant performance overhead, especially on the 3D images
(e.g., CT scans) used in medical applications. Hence, in this work, we estab-
lish our protocol based on the ENSEI construction, and explore UNET-specific
optimizations and cryptographic protocol designs to improve the practicality of
secure inference in medical segmentation.
3 Secure UNET for Blind Segmentation
3.1 BUNET: The Protocol
Fig. 1 shows an example of the BUNET protocol structured as an UNET archi-
tecture, where the input image goes through four steps. The operators used in
each step will be discussed in detail later in Section 3.2.
1. Setup: As our protocol takes both 2D and 3D images as inputs, the input
image is of dimension dim(U) = c × w × h × d (d = 1 for 2D inputs). Alice
first raster-scans her input image into a one-dimensional vector u of length
ℓ = c ·w ·h ·d. Bob does a similar transformation on his filter weights to obtain
the one-dimensional vector w. We use u0 to denote the input from Alice at
the 0-th layer, and w0 for that of Bob.
2. Convolution and Activation: We conduct a standard (input-hiding) con-
volution on the input image with activation functions followed. For each con-
volution layer with activation, we run
v0 = HomConv(u0,w0), and u1 = fa(v0) = SecAct(v0). (4)
for some weight vector w0. Here, fa is some abstract activation function (e.g.,
ReLU or square activation). The output u1 = fa(v0) will become the input
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to the next layer. We point out that the activation function has a significant
impact on both the accuracy and the inference time of UNET. Therefore, we
propose a hybrid UNET architecture, where both ReLU and square activations
are used. Here, the security guarantee is that Alice obtains no knowledge on
w0, and Bob knows nothing about u0 and v0 after the protocol execution.
3. Pooling: While the standard UNET architecture employs max pooling [23] as
the downsampling method, in the experiment, we show a large performance
difference between max pooling and average pooling protocols, due to the
change of underlying protocol. We also demonstrate in Table 2 that the two
pooling methods result in marginal accuracy differences. Hence, we modified
the UNET architecture to employ only average pooling. Consequently, the
proposed protocol executes u2 = SecAvgPool(u1). For an input of length ℓ
and pooling size ζp = zw,p × zh,p × zd,p, the pooled output have a dimension
of ℓ/ζp.
4. Bottom-Level Convolution and Activation: Here, Step 2 is repeated, and
we get u3 as output. Note that the input and output dimension is reduced by
Step 3, so Step 4 is computationally lighter than Step 2.
5. Transposed Convolution and Concatenation: While the arithmetic pro-
cedures for transposed convolution is essentially the same as a normal convo-
lution, protocol-level modifications are required for the image concatenation
and padding operations. Concretely, after obtaining input from the previous
layer, e.g., u3, Alice needs to zero-pad u3 in an interleaving manner, according
to some stride size ζt = zw,t × zh,t × zd,t. The padded result, u3, will have a
length of ℓ·ζt/ζp. Subsequently, Alice uses u3 as input to execute the following
protocols.
v4 = HomConv(u3,w3), and u4 = v4||u1. (5)
One subtlety is that, the output from the 1-st layer, u1, needs to be concate-
nated with the output from the transposed convolution layer for the rest of
the normal convolutions. However, u1 and v4 will actually be encrypted under
different keys. Thus, both results need to be decrypted and concatenated by
Alice. The concatenated result, v1||u4, will become the inputs to later layers.
6. Readout: Here, we applies the SecArgmax function over the label dimensions.
It is noted that, since the Softmax operator is monotonic and is only required
in the learning process, we avoid using a separate protocol for Softmax, and
directly perform a secure Argmax. Since the Argmax function is a pixel-wise
comparison function across the label dimension, it can be implemented using
a simple GC protocol similar to the secure ReLU protocol, and we omit a
formal presentation.
Threat Model and Security The threat model for BUNET is that both Bob
and Alice are semi-honest, in the sense that both parties follow the protocol
prescribed above (e.g., encrypting real data with Enc, etc.), but want to learn
as much information as possible from the other party. Our protocol guarantees
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that Alice learns only the segmentation results, while Bob learns nothing about
the inputs from Alice.
The security of the proposed protocol can be easily reduced to that of existing
works [3, 15], where any attack against BUNET will result in a non-negligible
advantage against the ENSEI [3] and Gazelle [15] protocols.
3.2 The Cryptographic Building Blocks
Here, we discuss each of the cryptographic primitives used in the previous section
in details.
HomConv: The HomConv operator obliviously convolve two vectors u and
w. A very recent work [3] discovered that, instead of the complex rotate-and-
accumulate approach proposed by previous works [15], homomorphic convolution
can be performed in the frequency domain, where the only computation needed in
the homomorphic domain is the  (homomorphic Hadamard product) operator.
Therefore, the homomorphic convolution protocol proceeds as follows.
1. First, Alice performs an integer discrete Fourier transform (DFT) (i.e., number
theoretic transform in [3]) on u and obtain its frequency-domain representa-
tion, uˆ. She simply encrypts this input array into a ciphertext [uˆ] (when ℓ > n,
the vector is encrypted into multiple ciphertexts) by running [uˆ] = EncK(uˆ),
where K is the encryption key. The resulting ciphertext is transferred to Bob.
2. Before receiving any input from Alice, Bob applies DFT on his filter weights
to obtain wˆ. In this process, the size of the filter will be padded to be ℓ. Upon
receiving the inputs [uˆ] from Alice, Bob computes
[vˆ] = [uˆ ◦ wˆ] = [uˆ] wˆ (6)
for all ciphertexts uˆ.
3. Finally, since vˆ contains information of the weights from Bob, Bob applies HSS
as [sˆA] = Share([vˆ], sˆB). Bob keeps sˆB and returns [sˆA] to Alice, where Alice
decrypts and obtain sˆA. Both Alice and Bob run inverse DFT on their shares
of secrets (i.e., sˆA and sˆB) and obtain sA and sB, respectively, completing the
protocol.
SecAct: The SecAct protocols are summarized as follows.
– ReLU: We follow the construction in [15] based on the GC protocol. Alice first
garbles the circuit with her share of secret sA. The garbled circuit obliviously
computes the following function
v = Rec(sA, sB), and sA = Share(ReLU(v), sB) (7)
where sB is a freshly generated share of secret from Bob. After protocol exe-
cution, Alice obtains sA, which contains ReLU(v) in an oblivious manner.
– Square: Since the square activation (i.e., y = x2) is essentially evaluating a
polynomial over the inputs, the computationally-light MT can be used instead
of GC. To use MT, we first share the secret v twice among Alice and Bob.
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Then, the MT protocol outlined in Section 2.1 can be executed, where both
x and y equal v. After the protocol execution, Alice and Bob respectively
obtain gA and gB where Rec(gA,gB) = v
2. The main observation here is
that, all computations are coefficient-wise multiplications and additions over
lg pA-bit integers. As a result, MT-based square activation is much faster than
GC-based ReLU activation.
SecPool: As mentioned above, two types of secure pooling can be imple-
mented, the SecMaxPool and the SecAvgPool operator. In [15], it is shown that
max-pooling can be implemented using the GC protocol as in Eq. (7), where
we replace the ReLU operator with the MaxPool operator. Meanwhile, for secure
average pooling, we can use a simple protocol that is purely based on PAHE.
Specifically, we can compute the window-wise sum of some vector v by calcu-
lating SecAvgPool(v) =
∑ζp−1
i=0 rot([v], i), where ζp is the pooling window size.
Since both homomorphic rotations and additions are light operations compared
to GC, SecAvgPool is much faster than SecMaxPool.
4 Accuracy Experiments and Protocol Instantiation
4.1 Experiment Setup
Due to the lack of immediate existing works, we compare BUNET with the
standard UNET architecture implemented by the ENSEI [3] protocol, which is
the best performing protocol on secure multi-class inference. Here, the standard
UNET architecture only utilizes max-pooling for pooling layers, and ReLU for
activation layers. We denote this architecture as the baseline architecture. As
shown in the appendix, the baseline architecture consists 19 convolution layers
including three transposed convolution layers, 14 activation layers, three average
pooling layers, and a readout layer implementing the SecArgmax function.
Our experiments are conducted on three datasets, GM [21], EM [7], and
HVSMR [20]. Due to the space constraint, we only present the accuracy and
performance results on the EM (two dimensional) and HVSMR (three dimen-
sional) datasets (GM will be added to the appendix).
The cryptographic performance is characterized on an Intel i5-9400 2.9GHz
CPU, and the accuracy results are obtained with an NVIDIA P100 GPU. The
adopted PAHE library is SEAL version 3.3.0 [25] (we set q, p to be 60-bit and 20-
bit integers, respectively, and n = 2048, ensuring a 128-bit security) and MT/GC
protocols are implemented using LowGear provided by MP-SPDZ [16,19].
4.2 Accuracy and Performance Results
In this section, we explore how the neural architecture of 3D-UNET impact on
the segmentation performance. In particular, it is important to see if the the
proposed architectural modifications for UNET result in satisfactory prediction
accuracy while accelerating the network inference time. We downsampled the
images in the HVSMR [20] dataset to a dimension of 64 × 64 × 64 containing
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Table 1. The Dice Accuracy on the HVSMR Dataset for Different Neural Architectures
ReLU+Max ReLU ReLU+Max ReLU Hybrid Square
Float Float 32-bit (Baseline) 16-bit 20-bit 16-bit
HVSMR Myo. Dice 0.74±0.04 0.73±0.04 0.73±0.05 0.73±0.05 0.71±0.05 0.52±0.14
HVSMR BP Dice 0.87±0.04 0.87±0.04 0.87±0.04 0.87±0.04 0.86±0.05 0.83±0.05
HVSMR Time (s) - - 42616 14205 3054.2 1118.2
EM Dice 0.9405 - 0.9411 0.9398 0.9385 0.8767
EM Time (s) - - 8838.1 2968.6 1077.9 227.16
SecAct SecPool HomConv SecArgMax Total
Secure Protocols
101
102
103
104
105
R
u
n
ti
m
e
 (
s
)
14x
Fig. 2. Runtime distribution for different cryptographic building blocks in a single run
of secure segmentation.
Table 2. Number of Activation Functions per Layer Batch
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
33554432 8388608 2097152 524288 2097152 8388608 33554432
three class labels, i.e., background, myocardium (myo.) and blood pool (BP).
The images in the EM dataset has 200 × 200 input for binary segmentation.
Table 2 summarizes the dice scores and runtime under various architectural
settings (HVSMR with 10-fold cross validation). Here, the pooling function is
average pooling unless otherwise stated. Hybrid refers to the neural architec-
ture where the first and the last layer batches use square activation, while all
other layer batches adopt ReLU activation. Here, a layer batch denotes two
convolution and activation layers with the same output feature dimensions and
channels. We have three main observations. First, the use of average pooling in-
stead of max pooling results in negligible accuracy degradation, on a level that
can likely be compensated by parameter tuning. Second, the UNET architecture
is robust in low-quantization environment, where we see little accuracy differ-
ence between floating point, 32-bit and 16-bit quantization factors, especially on
the EM dataset. Lastly, replacing all ReLU activations with squares results in
significant accuracy degradation for the segmentation of myocardium. However,
the BP prediction can be acceptable for a quick run of cheap evaluations, and
the hybrid architecture successfully achieves a good balance between accuracy
and performance.
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We record the total runtime for a single blind image segmentation with re-
spect to different 3-D UNET architectures. In Table 2 and Fig. 2, we illustrate
the per-layer-batch number of neuron activations and the runtime distribution
for different secure protocols in BUNET. As expected, the first and last two lay-
ers contain the most amount of activations, and replacing the GC-based heavy
ReLU activation with square activation results in an immediate 5x total runtime
reduction. In addition, it is observed that the runtime for ReLU activation func-
tions dominate the total runtime across architectures, while square activation is
as light as a frequency-domain homomorphic convolution operation.
Compared to the baseline 32-bit ReLU architecture, we obtain 8x–14x run-
time reduction with the reasonably accurate Hybrid architecture, and up to 39x
reduction with the cheapest (all-square) UNET implementation on EM. Finally,
we note that most NN operations can be parallelized as well as the cryptographic
building blocks. Therefore, since our performance is recorded on a single-thread
CPU, we expect further runtime reduction for BUNET on parallel computing
architectures.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we propose BUNET to perform blind medical image segmenta-
tion on encrypted medical images. The observation we make is that protocol
and network designs need to be jointly performed to achieve the best accuracy-
performance trade-off. By designing UNET-specific protocols and optimizing the
UNET architecture, we show that up to 8x–14x inference time reduction can be
achieved with negligible accuracy degradation on several medical datasets.
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1 Additional Experiment Results for EM/GM datasets
Table 1. The Dice Accuracy and Runtime for the GM Dataset for Different Neural
Architectures. Note that since we have the same architecture and input dimensions for
GM and EM, the runtime for the secure inference protocol is the same.
ReLU+Max ReLU ReLU+Max ReLU Hybrid Square
Float Float 32-bit (Baseline) 16-bit 16-bit 16-bit
GM Dice 0.5632 - 0.5581 0.5577 0.5607 0.5546
GM Time (s) - - 8838.1 2968.6 1077.9 227.16
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Epoch
0.0
0.1
0.2
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0.4
0.5
0.6
D
ic
e
Fig. 1. The learning curve for different neural architectures over 200 epoches. It can
be observed that the neural architecture with all-square activation encounters some
difficulties initially, but successfully proceeded learning later on.
2 Detailed Network Architecture
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 13
Table 2. The neural architecture for the 3-D UNET used in HVSMR dataset. The
input is of dimension 1×64×64×64 = 643 where 1 denotes a single channel. For EM and
GM, we replace the input dimension 643 with 2002, and the filter dimensions are kept
the same. Here, Quant. and Quantization indicate a quantization layer that quantize
all the outputs from the previous operation (e.g., convolution or square activation).
Meanwhile, Norm. denotes a normalization layer.
Layer Batch Layer Type Input Dim. Filter Dim. Output Dim.
1 Convolution+Quant. 1 × 643 64× 33 64× 643
1 Activation+Norm. 64× 643 - 64× 643
1 Quantization 64× 643 - 64× 643
1 Convolution+Quant. 64× 643 64× 33 64× 643
1 Activation+Norm. 64× 643 - 64× 643
1 Quantization 64× 643 - 64× 643
1 Pooling 64× 643 23 64× 323
2 Convolution+Quant. 64× 323 128× 33 128× 323
2 Activation+Norm. 128 × 323 - 128× 323
2 Quantization 128 × 323 - 128× 323
2 Convolution+Quant. 128 × 323 128× 33 128× 323
2 Activation+Norm. 128 × 323 - 128× 323
2 Quantization 128 × 323 - 128× 323
2 Pooling 128 × 323 23 128× 163
3 Convolution+Quant. 128 × 163 256× 33 256× 163
3 Activation+Norm. 256 × 163 - 256× 163
3 Quantization 256 × 163 - 256× 163
3 Convolution+Quant. 256 × 163 256× 33 256× 163
3 Activation+Norm. 256 × 163 - 256× 163
3 Quantization 256 × 163 - 256× 163
3 Pooling 256 × 163 23 256× 83
4 Convolution+Quant. 256× 83 512× 33 512× 83
4 Activation+Norm. 512× 83 - 512× 83
4 Quantization 512× 83 - 512× 83
4 Convolution+Quant. 512× 83 512× 33 512× 83
4 Activation+Norm. 512× 83 - 512× 83
4 Quantization 512× 83 - 512× 83
4 Transposed Convolution+Quant. 512× 83 256× 23 256× 163
5 Convolution+Quant. 512 × 163 256× 33 256× 163
5 Activation+Norm. 256 × 163 - 256× 163
5 Quantization 256 × 163 - 256× 163
5 Convolution+Quant. 256 × 163 256× 33 256× 163
5 Activation+Norm. 256 × 163 - 256× 163
5 Quantization 256 × 163 - 256× 163
5 Transposed Convolution+Quant. 256 × 163 128× 23 128× 323
6 Convolution+Quant. 256 × 323 128× 33 128× 323
6 Activation+Norm. 128 × 323 - 128× 323
6 Quantization 128 × 323 - 128× 323
6 Convolution+Quant. 128 × 323 128× 33 128× 323
6 Activation+Norm. 128 × 323 - 128× 323
6 Quantization 128 × 323 - 128× 323
6 Transposed Convolution+Quant. 128 × 323 64× 23 64× 643
7 Convolution+Quant. 128 × 643 64× 33 64× 643
7 Activation+Norm. 64× 643 - 64× 643
7 Quantization 64× 643 - 64× 643
7 Convolution+Quant. 64× 643 64× 33 64× 643
7 Activation+Norm. 64× 643 - 64× 643
7 Quantization 64× 643 - 64× 643
8 Convolution 64× 643 3× 33 3× 643
9 Argmax 3 × 643 - 1× 643
